Introduction
The concept of stratification is deeply embedded within sociology, most notably in relation to the analysis of social class, but has only been of relatively recent concern within the economics literature. Thus Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) in their seminal article quote a definition by the sociologist Lasswell (1965, p.10) : "In its general meaning a stratum is a horizontal layer, usually thought of as between, above or below other such layers or strata.
Stratification is the process of forming observable layers, or the state of being comprised of 2 layers." Key to this definition is the idea that stratification, unlike segregation, implies a hierarchical ordering of groups according to some metric that in many economic settings may be used to also quantify the scale of the resultant differences in outcomes between groups.
For example, occupational segregation in a labour market context will only lead to stratification in the earnings distribution if one group is crowded into lower paid occupations, with the resultant scale of economic disadvantage due to employment discrimination depending not only on the degree of segregation but also on the size of occupational pay differentials. Conversely, direct wage discrimination may not lead to significant stratification if groups are distributed equally among higher and lower paid occupations.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a class of stratification indices that depend in general on both the extent to which groups form well-defined layers or strata in the distribution of some economic outcome and the scale of between-group differences in those outcomes, since both are necessary consequences of the process of stratification.
1 Our approach is based on the measurement of stratification in terms of the impact on betweengroup inequality (see Milanovic and Yitzhaki, 2002; Monti and Santoro, 2011) , yielding indices that may be used to judge not only whether the overall level of stratification is higher in one population than another but can also be decomposed to yield unique estimates of the contribution of each pair of groups to overall stratification. In contrast, Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) measure stratification in terms of the impact of overlapping on inequality within groups, proposing a set of group-specific indices that capture each group's stratification with respect to the rest of the population but fail to provide a measure of the overall degree of stratification between groups in the population. The closely related group-specific indices in Yitzhaki (1994) are decomposable as weighted sums of pairwise indices that measure the 1 For expositional purposes we refer to "income stratification" though the measures are equally applicable to consumption, wealth or earnings.
3 degree of 'overlapping' of one group by another, but the asymmetry of the 'overlapping' concept makes intepretation of the indices problematic in terms of evaluating the overall degree of stratification. For example, in a population composed of only two groups then the first group can form a distinct stratum even if the second does not, where this will be the case if all first group incomes are concentrated at a point in the support of the second group distribution.
The proposed class of indices are specified as population-weighted averages of the degree of stratification between all pairs of groups in the population of interest. Pairwise stratification is defined in turn as the product of an 'identification index' and an 'alienation function', where the terminology is borrowed from the analogous literature on polarisation (see Esteban and Ray, 1994; Duclos et al., 2004) . The identification index captures the extent to which two groups constitute distinct strata in their combined income distribution and is defined as the difference in the probabilities that a randomly selected member of the more affluent group has a higher rather than a lower income than a randomly chosen member of the less affluent group. The alienation function is specified as a power function of the absolute difference in equally distributed equivalent (ede) incomes between the two groups, with this being set equal to one by definition if the value of the power or exponent is set equal to zero.
As with Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984) , the choice of power determines the interpretation of the resultant indices. In particular, zeroth power indices provide 'headcount' measures that reflect the odds that the richer of a randomly chosen pair of individuals will come from the more affluent group of which they are members. First power indices provide 'stratification gap' measures that further take into account the depth of stratification as measured by the absolute differences in ede incomes between groups. Stratification gap indices have a simple graphical representation using familiar tools from stochastic dominance analysis, reducing to twice the between-group 4 absolute Gini coefficient in welfare levels if there is no overlapping of group income distributions. Finally, second and higher integer power indices measure alienation as convex functions of pairwise ede income gaps and are therefore also sensitive to the distribution of ede income gaps over pairs of groups.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the proposed class of stratification indices and discusses both the general properties of the class and the specific attributes of headcount, stratification gap and higher power indices. Section 3 provides an empirical illustration based on the Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) analysis of world inequality in 1993 by regions. The final section summarises the contribution and offers some suggestions for further research.
Definition and properties of the class of stratification indices
We consider a population divided into K≥2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups that are ordered by ede income (as defined in (4) below) from the least to the most affluent group. implying that the probability of a randomly chosen member of group k having the same income as a randomly selected member of group l will have measure zero. The treatment of ties is discussed in the next sub-section. 
is the probability that the income of a random member of group k is greater than that of a random member of group l, where this is equal to the probability of transvariation (Gini, 1916; see Montanari, 2004 ) if group l is more affluent than group k. If two or more groups have identical ede incomes then they are ranked such that
for all relevant pairwise comparisons, where this secondary criterion for ranking distributions will generate a transitive ordering if the probability relationship between the sub-set of groups exhibits mutual rank transitivity (see De Baets et al., 2010) . 3 Finally if the two distributions cannot be ranked on the basis of either criteria (e.g.
if the two income distributions are identical) then the various indices to be considered below are invariant to the ordering of the groups, which is therefore chosen arbitrarily. The pairwise identification index kl I in (1) is defined as:
The measurement of pairwise stratification
where
kl I is thus equal to the signed difference in the probabilities that a randomly chosen member of group l will be better rather than worse off than a randomly selected member of group k, Dagum (1980) and the first-order 'discrimination index' 1  in Le Breton et al. (2008) if group l is the more affluent of the two groups, and has also been identified in this case with the 'loss of betweengroup inequality due to overlapping' (Monti and Santoro, 2011) . Its interpretation as an identification or classification index follows from the observation that if individuals from the two groups are randomly matched with each other then kl I will reflect the success with which group identity can be correctly determined by assuming that the better off individual within each pair will be from the more rather than less affluent group (see Montanari, 2004) . kl I will take its maximum value of one if group identity can be determined with certainty by 7 this rule, which will only be the case if the poorest member of the more affluent group is better off than any member of the less affluent group: not only will everyone from the more affluent group be among the richest people in the two groups but also all the richest people will be from the more affluent group. Conversely, kl I will equal zero if the income distributions of the two groups are identical such that the pairwise identification rule is entirely uninformative of group identity: the richer person in any pair is equally likely to be from one group as the other if the two groups are indistinguishable in terms of incomes.
kl I can also be negative, which will be the case if the richer individual is more likely to be from the less rather than the more affluent group, taking its minimum value when all but one person in the more affluent group is worse off than everybody in the less affluent group.
The alienation function
where the absolute difference in ede incomes
provides a measure of the 'economic distance' between the two groups (Shorrocks, 1982) , with Chakravarty and Dutta (1987) 
where  may be interpreted as the Atkinson (1970) policymakers an instrument to evaluate stratification with varying sensitivity to distributional issues depending on social preferences. In particular, there seems no reason to believe that aversion to individual income inequality and to groupwise alienation will necessarily be the same so  and  are treated as independent parameters. For example, income differences among men may be acceptable to the extent that these reflect differential rewards for effort, whereas those between men and women might not as gender is a matter of circumstance. 
Definition and general properties of the class of stratification indices
The proposed class of stratification indices   , S  is obtained as a population-weighted average of the pairwise indices
where kl pp is the probability that the first of two individuals randomly selected with replacement from the population will be from group k and the second from group l, and which therefore sum to one over all possible combinations. S  . We note that a symmetric, ede income-preserving 'squeeze' in the welfare distribution of one group, say from ()
as shown in Figure 1a , cannot reduce identification and hence stratification. In contrast, a reduction in within-group variation holding between-group differences constant will lead to a fall in inequality according to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
Figure 1b offers a graphical proof of the identification property that makes use of the concept of a 'λ-squeeze' defined in Duclos et al. (2004) , 4 although the argument holds more generally for any symmetric 'squeeze' operator applied to () 
, S  will not fall due to this λ-squeeze if the degree of identification of group k does not fall with respect to either more or less affluent groups. We demonstrate that kl I will not fall if the reference group l is at least as affluent as group k, with extension to the opposite case immediate given symmetry of the welfare distributions. 0, sgn( ) P P ;
where   14 changes in the welfare of individuals in the least affluent group whose welfare is less, and remains less, than that of any person in any other group.
Properties of stratification gap indices
The first power member of the class,   1, S  , may be re-written from (5) as:
is the population mean ede income gap and
covariance between pairwise levels of alienation and identification which will typically be positive.
 

1,
S  has the same units as income and is invariant to translations of the welfare measure.
 
1,
S  reflects not only the incidence but also the depth of stratification and may therefore be interpreted as a 'stratification gap' measure. For example, the lack of overlap between a rich and a poor group will count more towards the 'stratification gap' as measured by   1, S  than the same lack between two moderately afluent groups: in the limit, two groups with identical ede incomes will not contribute to imply greater alienation aversion: in the limit as   then the value of the index will be dominated by the pairwise stratification between the most and least affluent groups, with the latter group − though not necessarily the poorest members of it − providing the most cost-effective target for an anti-stratification support policy.
Empirical illustration.
By way of illustration, this section follows Allanson (2014) in further elaborating the empirical analysis presented in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) of world inequality by regions in 1993. 9 The top panel in Table 1 presents estimates from their Tables 4 and 7 reveals that the regions of the world are broadly divided into three broad layers or strata -with Africa and Asia at the bottom, EFSU and LAC in the middle and WENAO on its own at the top of the world income distribution -where the degree of both identification and alienation between regions in the same layer was much lower than 9 These regions are referred to as 'continents' in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) though the correspondence is not exact.
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that between regions in different strata. Indeed, there was virtually no stratification of the African and Asian distributions in the bottom stratum nor of the EFSU and LAC distributions in the middle layer, with pairwise identification indices close to zero and mean income differences less than $1000. In contrast, the WENAO income distribution was highly stratified from those of every other region, with the relevant pairwise identification indices ranging between 0.656 and 0.902 and all mean income differences greater than twice the mean world income level of $3000. All other cross-pairwise measures were intermediate with the population-weighted mean identification index and mean income gap equal to 0.312 and $2415 respectively: in particular, the pairwise identification of the EFSU and Asian distributions was above average even though the mean income difference between the two regions was not much larger than that between EFSU and LAC.
The top panel of Table 2 reports the headcount index (0,1) S , which is equal to the population-weighted mean identification index reported in Table 1 . Thus the difference in the probabilities that the richer of two randomly chosen individuals will come from the richer rather than the poorer region of which they are inhabitants was equal to 0.312, or 0.518=0.312/0.603 conditional on the two individuals being from different regions. It follows from (1) that the population-weighted mean probability of transvariation (between distinct regions) was equal to 0.241=(1−0.518)/2, i.e. there was a roughly one in four chance that a randomly chosen individual from a poorer region would be better off than a randomly Overall the various indices all portray a broadly similar picture of the pattern of stratification given that the correlation coefficient between the pairwise identification indices and mean income gaps was equal to 0.735. We have argued that stratification necessarily results in both pairwise identification and alienation so this positive correlation is to be expected although the strength of the association will likely differ depending on the specific context. Recalling that a ceteris paribus increase in within-group inequality will (typically) reduce stratification, the combination in some poorer Asian countries, most notably China and India, of high per capita growth rates and the emergence of prosperous middle classes may be expected to have reduced overall levels of both alienation and identification between regions in more recent years.
Conclusion
This paper offers a new class of parametric indices that is based on a conceptualisation of stratification as a process that results in a hierarchical ordering of groups and therefore seeks to capture not only the extent to which groups form well-defined layers or strata in the income distribution but also the scale of the resultant differences in ede incomes between 21 them. The indices provide measures of the overall degree of stratification between two or more groups in a population, where the dominance properties of the indices are similar to those of the Duclos et al. (2004) polarisation measures. First the identification property distinguishes stratification from inequality since an ede income-preserving "squeeze" in the welfare distribution of one group cannot reduce identification under certain specified conditions whereas it will lead to a fall in inequality according to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. More straightforwardly, an identification-preserving scalar expansion of all welfare differences about the overall population ede income will unambiguously increase alienation between groups. Finally stratification will typically be maximised if the population is equally divided between the most and least affluent groups. However it is important to recognise that stratification is not the same as polarisation due to the fundamentally different characterisations of identification employed in the two sets of measures, with an axiomatic derivation of the proposed class of stratification measures remaining a topic for further research. The link between the stratification gap index and the generalised concentration index further suggests that it may be possible to establish welfare foundations for at least some members of the new class of indices.
The proposed class of measures benefit from their ease of interpretation and practical utility. In particular, the headcount and gap indices reflect the incidence and depth of stratification: the former reflects the odds that the richer of any randomly chosen pair of individuals is a member of the more affluent group from which they are drawn, while the latter may be interpreted as a measure of the perceived average difference in ede incomes between groups based on individuals' actual positions in the overall income distribution.
Each index is a population-weighted average of pairwise indices so it is possible to judge not only whether the overall level of stratification is higher in one population compared to another but also to estimate the contribution of individual groups to observed levels of overall 
